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Abstract
Distinctive forms ofcorrnption and bribery are identified and the political
dimensions of 'corrnption' are duly noted The prevalence of corrnption
worldwide is then indicated, together with the shortcomings of some
current institutional responses. Some evidence regarding Indian MNC
managers' experiences with corrnption and bribery is then set out, together
with several evidence-based approaches and techniques for reducing
corrnption. These include the analysis of consequences by individual
decision-makers, principle-based reasoning at the managerial level and
balanced changes at the political level.
Introduction
Historically, all societies have harboured an element of corruption. In India,
for example, Kautilya's Arthashastra long ago set out as many as 40 different
ways in which public officials might make illegitimate gain from public office.
Today, the 'greasing of palms' remains an indispensable component of many
successful business strategies, especially in the LDC context. Indeed,
corruption in some form now seems to be almost routine (Noonan 1984; Pieth
1999; Eigen 2002; Kale 2004). Furthermore, recent major corporate scandals
in the West have reinforced the perception that it is very widespread.
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At the same time, there has been a steady growth of the Business Ethics
movement, accompanied by anti-corruption initiatives at the global-
institutional level, particularly the expansion of activities by Transparency
International (T!) and the OECD (1999) anti-bribery convention. At the micro-
level, meanwhile, consultants and educators have enthusiastically promoted
the use of ethical codes of practice, mission statements, stakeholder-oriented
strategy models and ethical decision making (EDM) models. Almost all of
these initiatives, which are naturally regarded with a mixture of cynicism and
hope, advocate some sort of restraint on selfishness in the economic sphere,
together with heightened commitments to wider communities and universal
humane ideals.
"
Given the vast funds that are at stake, sums that can dwarf most strategic
business investments, it is regrettable that only a few articles that are
specifically about corruption and corporate crime have appeared in
mainstream management journals. Indeed, the issue of corruption has been
largely neglected in the literature related to 'business and society' until quite
recently (Schnatterly 2003; Robertson & Watson 2004). Meanwhile, most
business school programmes have had much to say about investment and
internationalisation strategies, but have remained silent on such delicate topics
as how to behave in corruption related contexts.
Part of the problem in the academy is due to the obvious difficulty of
obtaining any directly relevant micro-level empirical data, so that there are
very few empirical-behavioural models of corruption-related processes. This
'difficulty' was first noted by Klitgaard (1988). More recently, in a study of
12 German MNC's operating in India, Berg and Holtbrugge (2001) reported
that 'bribery' came below codes of conduct and corporate philanthropy in
'importance' to managers. As is typical in studies of such sensitive issues, three
out of the twelve respondents in that study reserved comment on bribery. It
seems that manager's responses to inquiries on such issues are not necessarily
the whole truth; that is, information voluntarily placed in the public domain
can sometimes be nothing more than deceptive communications, or strategic
public relations. However, the difficulty of obtaining meaningful data about
corruption was overcome to some extent in a study reported here (in section 4)
which made use of a long established network of senior MNC managers in
Mumbai (Bombay) India, each of whom is known personally to the principal
researcher.
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Overview
In the following section, various distinctive fonns of corruption and bribery
are identified and classified. At the same time, the political and ideological
dimensions of corruption are noted. The worldwide prevalence of corruption is
then briefly described (in section 3), together with some apparent possible
shortcomings of the relevant DECD Convention. Some new evidence is then
set out, regarding MNC senior managers' attitudes towards corruption, with
their related experiences. This is followed (in section 5) by a specification and
discussion of some possible approaches to reducing corruption, at several
levels: First, individual's decisions about bribe payment are analysed in tenns
of their psychological and financial consequences. Next, corporate-level or
managerial approaches are considered, including the use of some principle-
based decision making guides. Finally, some prescriptions for change are
considered at the level of social systems; that is, within the politics and
ideology of the new global capitalism.
Corruption
Early studies of corruption focussed on business-to-government transactions,
defining these as 'violations of common interest for special advantage' or as
'undue influence for private gain' (Rogow & Lasswell 1963; Leff 1964). Later,
Noonan (1984) referred to offering 'inducements to alter conduct from nonnal'
and much more recently Argandonna (2003) has drawn attention to the
growing importance of 'private-to-private' (ie, business to business) fonns of
corruption.., In all these cases, the notion of 'corruption' has encompassed
specific acts like paying bribes, but it has also alluded to dynamic processes
whereby one actor corrupts another, or where an actor is embedded within a
nexus of illegal or unethical activity in a social system (Elliot 1997; Rauch
1997; Cockroft 2003).
Corrupt acts have also been classified by their context, purpose and magnitude
(Elliot 1997; Rauch 1997), suggesting that each fonn merits a distinctive
prescription. Examples include:
i) A facilitating payment to secure preferential treatment from a public
servant (Motorola in Russia, as described in Donaldson, Werhane and
Cording 2002, p. 429).
ii) A bribe to secure a competitive advantage, in an otherwise legal
transaction, involving (a) of a public official (eg, Lockheed in Japan, in
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the 1970's), or (b) an officer of another business corporation
(Argandonna 2003).
iii) An act of extortion (eg, a demand for payments for the return of
kidnapped persons).
iv) A bribe to have an illegal activity performed in (a) a legitimate regime
(eg, bribing a jailer to free a convicted murderer), or (b) an oppressive
regime (eg, a bribe to free a prisoner from a concentration camp, as
described in Rose-Ackerman 1978, p. 9).
Bribe giver..
Initiates
Bribe
Receiver..
Complies
Initiates Complies
Giveris"
passive
Receiver is
active'
"
Figure 1: Active and passive corruption
When assessing the ethicality of each of these forms, one can further
distinguish between active bribery (offering or soliciting bribes) versus
passive bribery, or responding to solicitations (Figure 1). In addition one can
consider whether or not any payment in question can reasonably be expected
to result in subsequent violations of human rights, harm to relevant
stakeholder communities, or damage to the natural environment. As discussed
subsequently (in section 5) in some situations where such harms and violations
seem genuinely unlikely, the ethicality of making bribe payments to secure
business can sometimes be quite finely balanced.
Consequences
According to Sen (1999, p. 275) corruption is 'a major stumbling block in the
path to successful economic progress' as it tends to undermine competition and
draw investment away from productive pursuits. Sen also noted that
consequences of corruption include the fostering of violent organisations.
However, it is quite uncommon to see public documents that refer to the
------------------------------------
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serious social, environmental and moral consequences of corruption, as
distinct from its economic consequences.
These 'social' consequences include serious violations of human rights;
extreme distributive injustices and various forms of oppression, whilst
corruption is also closely associated with harm to the natural environment.
Indeed, the Environmental Sustainability Index 200 I, which ranked the
environmental performance of 122 countries, found a rank-correlation of
(0.75) with Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
2000. Despite this, the issues of environmental and stakeholder interests and
the protection of human rights has remained essentially implicit in almost all
recent policy discourse and documents, even though all these rights and
interests are very vulnerable, indeed shockingly vulnerable to corruption-
related activities by corporations operating in the LDC context.
Ideology
Noonan's definition of corruption referred to 'normality'. However, when this
is placed alongside the idea of an 'oppressive regime' mentioned in (iv) above,
it becomes quite clear that that corruption can be inherent in the nature of a
political system (Scott 1972) or its associated ideology. This aspect of
corruption is discussed further below (in section 5) but it can be illustrated
quIckly with reference to a few well-documented historical episodes in
international business (Table 1).
Table 1: t Cases and Forms of Corruption
Case , .TyPe of violation of common interest
Lockheed Grand corruption, anti-competitive, passive bribe
solicited by agent of foreign government.
Motorola Passive facilitating payment, normal business
development, apparently no direct harms.
Enron in India Rewards to politicians who permitted human rights
violations, environmental damage, anti-competitive
deals.
Shell in Nigeria Resources contributed to oppressive military regime.
Human rights violations and extreme injustices ignored,
environment damaged, profits repatriated.
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The cases of Lockheed, Motorola, Enron and Shell, for example
(cf. Donaldson et al. 2002; Gini 2005) all indicate that the above descriptions
and consequences of corruption involving public officials can be quite similar
to the other types of 'violation of the common interest' that happen to be quite
'nonnal' elements of corporate strategy (and are often taught prescriptively in
business schools). Put differently, the 'nonns', 'standards' or 'order' of global
capitalism and international business that might be placed at risk from
corruption and bribery, already display some noteworthy limitations with
respect to the common good. Arguably, any anti-corruption initiatives,
campaigns or techniques that ignore or gloss over this crucial point are quite
likely to be counter-productive, or even become oppressive.
Prevalence
It is partly as a result of the imperfect ideology of global capitalism, with its
inherent moral failings, that some fonn of corruption in international business
affairs often appears to be inevitable. For example, with reference to India,
Kale (2004) recently wrote that 'everyday...degrees and jobs are being
bought. ..moral values are trampled upon, while the unscrupulous rule.
Thriving corruption is (the) daily fare'. More generally, following the release
of the 2002 Bribe payers Index (BPI) by the NGD Transparency International
(TI), its chainnan Peter Eigen commented, 'our new survey leaves no doubt
that large numbers of multinational corporations from the richest nations are
pursuing a criminal course to win contracts in the leading emerging market
economies of the world'.
TI's findings were based on a survey of 835 business experts in 15 emerging
market economies, including India. The background to the TI study dates back
to the 1990's, when the issue of corruption and bribery appeared on the agenda
of the UN, as well as the World Bank and the DECD. An DECD convention
then came into effect, in 1999, that 'criminalises the active bribery of foreign
officials'. It was signed by 34 nations. Three years later, however, the BPI
indicated that those MNC's based in the signatory countries were not lagging
behind in their levels of bribery, nor had the criminalisation of bribery been
much of a deterrent to international business managers.
Significantly in the present context, the DECD anti-corruption policy goal was
once again framed in tenns of 'good governance and economic development';
but it did not mention such ideas as corporate social responsibilities, ethical
decision-making, stakeholder management and triple-bottom-line reporting,
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which are the central doctrine of business ethics. Like many anti-corruption
initiatives, all the latter ideas and practices are plainly intended to move
societies and individuals away from corruption and to overcome the known
limitations of global capitalism (Singer 2003).
New Evidence
As mentioned earlier, it is very difficult to obtain valid data about corruption
through direct approaches. However, a study recently conducted by the
principal researcher overcame this to some extent by making use of a long
established network of contacts amongst senior MNC managers in Mumbai
(Bombay), which is the, financial capital of India. Questionnaire-based
interviews were conducted between 2002-3, aimed at recording their actual
experiences with respect to corruption and bribery, as well as their general
attitudes towards it.
A sample of 70 well-known MNC's and other large companies located in
Mumbai was drawn from diverse industries, including banks, airlines,
pharmaceuticals, information technology and electronics, consumer goods, oil,
automobile and heavy electrical. The specific corporate identities remain
protected by a confidentiality agreement, however, the seventy companies are
all market leaders or close followers in their respective segments, each having
a minimum turnover of at least Indian Rupees I billion each. Besides, all of
them command premium brands and enjoy substantial shares of the Indian
market. l
Out of these seventy, as many as 41 responded (cf. Appendix I). The
executives interviewed were at the levels of Chief Executive Officer or else
senior managers dealing with public relations or involved in business
promotion. The questionnaires were administered in person and interviews
were conducted as necessary in order to ensure clarity of the responses, which
for present purposes can be summarised as follows:
i) Of the 41 senior corporate officers, 37 had been asked to make bribe
payments in India.
ii) 35 out of 41 reported that they had at some time lost business as a result
of non-payment of a bribe that had been solicited by another party
(ie, passive corruption).
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iii) 27 had subsequently offered bribes in order to secure deals, after they
had experienced lost business due to previously resisting bribery.
iv) 33 of the 41 respondents reported that their company had written
policies about bribery, but it was also found that only 3 of these policies
were explicitly justified in terms of the various negative consequences of
bribery.
v) All of these 33 had actually referred to company policy when faced with
passive corruption.
vi) 37 of the 41 managers expressed views to the effect that 'humans are not
corrupt by nature'. That is, they tended towards the belief that people
become corrupted by circumstances, or the system. ,f
vii) With regard to legal regimes, 11 felt that law and enforcement could
have only a minor impact on overall levels of corruption, whilst another
29 believed that legislation can prevent corruption 'to an extent'. Only 1
felt that legislation could totally eliminate corruption.
viii) All 41 believed that corruption had a negative impact on society and that
it sometimes leads to human rights abuses.
ix) 7 of the 41 said they had been forced to deal with extortion and/or
organised crime.
These findings broadly concur with previous studies (Klitgaard 1988; Berg &
Holtbrugge, 2001; Robertson & Watson 2004) in. consistently pointing to the
following general propositions: First, corruption and criminal activity ~s
widespread in international business dealings. Secondly, individual's efforts to
take a stand against corruption, by refusing to pay bribes, very often results in
loss of business with consequential harms to stakeholders. Furthermore, with
respect to formal policies and proclamations, there has been a general failure
to place sufficient emphasis on the business and societal consequences of
corruption, not to mention the personal consequences. It is now also very
evident that legal deterrence, which relies upon extrinsic and fear-based
motivation, has not been particularly effective. Finally, many international
business managers believe that corruption is a problem inherent to the entire
social system, or nexus, so that it requires solutions that go beyond the
cultivation of virtuous individuals, or the development of more ethical
corporate cultures.
~---------------------------------------------
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Reducing Corruption
The notion of 'reducing corruption' also has distinctive meanings, depending
on the levels of the 'nexus' that one is considering (Table 2). For example, at
the trans-nationallevel one is essentially dealing with grand ideals, such as the
possible moral progress of all humanity. At the level of particular nation-states
(eg, India, USA, etc), one can consider corruption with respect to political
ideologies, legislative instruments and the prospects for wise leadership.
Corporations can contribute to corruption reduction by augmenting their
strategies and policies so that they more directly support the 'common good'
(for example, the changes that appear to have taken place at Royal Dutch Shell
in the period 1996-97, or the advertised human rights commitments at
International Power). Finally, individuals can contribute to positive change
simply by becoming more mindful of the intrinsic value of personal integrity,
whilst also paying more attention to the negative consequences of corruption,
for self and for others.
Table 2: Levels and Transitions
';"Level le - ,.". N'!ture9fthe transition<.....;::-.:§:.. :
Trans-national Moral progress of humanity
Nation-state Change of government or policy, enlightenment of
leaders
Corporate and MNC Implanting ethics, augmenting strategy
Individual Becoming reflective, developing integrity
More specific approaches to reducing corruption can then be developed at all
of these levels: the individual or psychological, the corporate or managerial, as
well as the systemic or ideological. In each case, the limited available
evidence offers some broad guidance on how to effect the needed changes and
transitions. However, it should not be forgotten that changes at these three
levels are inter-dependent. On the one hand, it is hard for an individual to act
with integrity amidst a nexus of corruption; but it is also possible for
enlightened political leaders to 'enable individuals ....to feel the spark of life'
(cf. Kale 2004, quoting Ghandi) and to be catalysts for change by appealing to
humane ideals.
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Individual and Psychological
At the individual level, there is no doubt that powerful psychological factors
come into operation, in any corruption-related context. For example, the
securing of a single contract or a bid may be crucial for a manager's career
advancement or the company's performance (as indicated in the famous 1970's
Lockheed case testimony). Furthermore, managers confronting demands for
bribe payment are often under pressure of time and immersed in a negative
psychological field or ambience. In such. circumstances, decisions by
individuals are often based on a narrowing of perception akin to panic. They
are unlikely to be based on a thorough consideration of consequences, nor the
reflective and deliberative forms of rationality which are associated.with ethics
and ideals.
Some of the consequences for the individual of a decision to pay a bribe can
be expressed in a more structured way, in terms of psychic utilities
(cf. Appendix 2). This approach expands the notion of the 'consequences' of a
corrupt act in a way that any reflectively rational individual really ought to
consider, but rarely does. The 'psychic' consequences include: personal fears
and anxieties about possible discovery and prosecution, an expected loss of
self esteem, a weakening of the will, a sense of resignation and a likely loss of
idealism. Typically, all of these foreseeable consequences are then amplified
by the reflective individual's realisation that each corrupt act makes future
corrupt acts with their net consequences more likely to occur.
In addition, an individual manager can consider the typical business and
financial consequences of a decision to pay a bribe. These include: the net
business benefits from the exchange or business deal in question (indicated as
a benefit, or '+' in the figure in Appendix 2), together with an increased
likelihood of net benefits from future similar business deals (net of their bribe
payments). Set against this, there are the expected legal penalties and
reputation effects associated with possible discovery of the bribe (as in the
Lockheed case, for example), together with the expected long-run dollar
benefits from non-payment, due to (a) recognition by other honest players, and
(b) a general strengthening of the individuals' will. Finally, there is a marginal
(2nd order) 'shadow of the future' effect, in that every act of bribery, together
with copies of that act by others, damages the overall business system.
As mentioned earlier (where it was reported that only 3 out of 41 managers in
the India study knew of any code that even mentioned consequences), there
has been a quite general failure to draw attention to these typical personal and
business considerations, or to make them explicit in codes, guides and
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policies. Yet, consideration of the consequences of an action is often regarded
by ethicists as the first and most fundamental of steps on the path towards
more ethical behaviour l . Accordingly, where guidelines, codes of practice, or
decision making models (akin to popular strategy 'models') are used to assist
managers in corruption related contexts they should, like many other EDM
techniques, first and foremost set out in full the generic consequences of
bribery and corruption.
Corporate and Managerial
Ethics 'techniques', guidelines and codes can of course be regarded with
cynicism. Indeed, in some cases, their real purpose has been simply to reduce
pressure on businesses from NGO's and to reduce any fines imposed by courts,
especially in the USA. For example, the infamous Enron code of ethics is now
exhibited in the Smithsonian Museum, where it has become a monument to
extreme managerial hypocrisy and public naivete (Sims & Brinkman 2003).
More generally, the language of 'ethics' has often been deployed by power
elites in order to divert attention away from their own power plays and
excessive remuneration (Bauman 1998)
On the other hand, many companies appear to have quite sincere policies and
codes (Gordon & Miyake 2001) some of which specifically relate to
corruption; but these typically do nothing more that provide managers with a
simplistic list of 'do-not's'. They fail to set out generic consequences, neither
do they really attempt to influence managers' hearts and minds. Such a
proscriptive approach to managing corruption is not only unsatisfactory from
the point :bf view of moral psychology, it is also quite impractical. This is
indicated in the following example of a situation involving a passive
facilitating payment, that falls within actual personal experience of one of the
authors:
Company X is a fruit importer and distributor with a clearly worded
corporate policy of 'no bribes'. It opens up a new branch in country Y where
customs officials always expect a facilitating payment to clear every
consignment. The assigned manager learns that their consignments of fruit
will not be cleared without a facilitating payment. The company has a clear
choice of either permitting the fruit to rot and lose money, or to pay the
customs officials.
I According to RE Freeman (1999, p.235) 'Hardin (1998) has argued persuasively that if we
take bounded rationality and a thorough going uncertainty about the world seriously
enough, consequences may be all that our moral apparatus can handle'.
-------------
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In situations like this one, a manager might be well advised to give in to the
solicited bribe or facilitating payment, either as a matter of commercial
prudence, or even as a matter of moral principle (Roy, 2001). The manager
must consider, for example, the possibility that an initiator of a 'facilitating
payment' might be in a condition of severe poverty, or that the payment in
question might have no expected adverse consequence for human rights and
the environment (indeed, rotting food can be an immediate hazard). On the
other hand, many thoughtful managers remain uncomfortable with making
such payments, perhaps noting that they might reinforce the dynamic of
corruption in the wider society. Therefore, in practice, managers need to know
when to break the normal 'do-not' rules. Indeed, according to (Molyneaux
2003, p. 142), 'knowing when to break the rules appropriately may be a sign of
real respect and understanding of them'. This knowledge, in turn, involves
some familiarity with philosophical concepts and principles, such as hyper-
norms (Donaldson & Dunfee 1999) and the principle of double effect
(Bomann-Larsen & Wiggen 2003).
Hypernorms2 are considered to be universal and are therefore in tension with
the type of norm that seems most relevant to circumstances involving bribery
in international business. Collectively the latter 'mildly conflicting' norms span
what Donaldson and Dunfee (1999 p. 222) have described as a 'moral free
space'. A manager confronting passive bribery demands is often deeply into
this 'free space' and is therefore in need of some navigational assistance, so to
speak. Such assistance can then be offered by relevant ethical principles,
together with guidance on their application.
In the case of passive bribery, the ethical principle of double effect (PDE)
seems most relevant3. It has already been applied to various international
business problems on the grounds that 'even if business is conducted for a
legitimate purpose .... harmful side effects will occur' (Bomann-Larsen &
Wiggen 2003, p. 4). In the case of business bribe payments in general, these
harmful side effects (HSE's) can include the reinforcement of the dynamic of
corruption in the societies involved, as well as human rights violations and
environmental damage.
However, according to the PDE, an action with an HSE is not morally
blameworthy provided that the following five conditions all hold:
2 Hypemorms are the universal norms that are assumed to underpin contractual relationships
in all societies.
3 It was originally formulated within the just-war tradition of Political Science and relates to
actions that have harmful side effects.
Reducing Corruption in International Business: Behavioural, Managerial and Political Approaches 15
i) the main ends and means are good, or neutral,
ii) the HSE is not part of the ends, nor used to achieve the ends,
iii) the intended good outweighs the harm of the HSE,
iv) the HSE is unavoidable if the main good is to be achieved,
v) the actor (eg, manager) has taken steps to minimise the HSE.
A passive facilitating payment in which there is no expectation of human
rights violation nor environmental harm does indeed meet the first four of
these conditions. In the case of the 'fruit on the dock', for example, we can see
that: (i) the main ends and means are offloading the fruit and getting it to
market, which are indeed good; (ii) the HSE (the strengthening of the dynamic
of corruption) is certainly not part of the ends, nor is it used per se to achieve
those ends; (iii) by almost any reasonable estimate, the intended good
(marketing the fruit) outweighs the HSE harm (an abstract and almost
negligible increment in corruption); (iv) the HSE is also likely to be
inescapable and unavoidable, if the good is to be achieved: if you don't pay the
bribe, as a matter of fact, the fruit will rot; although there ought to be an effort
to seek or design a feasible alternative. Finally, the fifth condition of the PDE
(taking steps to minimise the HSE) can be met, simply by having the company
engage in an ongoing programme of corporate support of wider anti-
corruption initiatives. These are the kinds of initiatives often undertaken by
NGO's and good governments, aimed at disrupting the dynamic of corruption.
The other forms of bribery that were identified in section 2 (active bribery,
extortion, etc) invite other distinctive ethical prescriptions (cf. Appendix 3).
Where active corruption is under consideration, the prescription is simply 'do
not proceed', except in special cases that are outside the ambit of most
business dealings, such as offering a bribe to liberate an oppressed victim of a
corrupt regime. The ethics here is quite simple: initiation of bribery might
activate a dynamic of corruption, where none existed before. Next, in those
passive corruption decisions where there is indeed a likelihood of human
rights violations, the ethical prescription is once again, 'do-not proceed', since
one ought not to be instrumental in such violations. The remaining case is
passive extortion. In these circumstances, compliance with extorted payments
might be ethically endorsed, provided that that the payment is essentially
unavoidable; that is, there is no known alternative way of securing the deal
(eg, payment in exchange for the safe return of a kidnapped person).
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Systemic and Ideological
Finally, approaches to corruption reduction can be considered at the systemic,
political or ideological level. It quickly becomes apparent that most formal
definitions of corruption have been very conservative, referring to
'inducements to alter conduct from normal' (Noonan 1984), or 'deviations from
norms' (Nye 1967; Scott 1972), or behaviours that are 'destructive ofa system
of public civic order' (Rogow & Lasswell 1963). None of these definitions
refer to the possibility that the system itself might in some sense be corrupt
and unethical, nor have they challenged any particular political system, or
'order'. More general descriptions of corruption have referred to private gains
at the public expense, such as 'violations of common interest for special
advantage' (Rogow & Lasswell 1963), or 'undue influence for private gain'
(Leff 1964).
As mentioned previously, all of these descriptions also apply quite directly to
the 'norms' of business strategy and the 'order' of global capitalism. One only
need consider, for example, the extremely common practices of lobbying for
special privilege, deceptive marketing, payments of fees within interlocking
directorates, or almost any business practice that deliberately exploits market
power or other known limitations of markets with respect to the common
good. To the extent that individuals and businesses find themselves embedded
within a society that seems corrupt in this way, the above individual and
corporate approaches to corruption reduction appear profoundly limited;
indeed some would say they are futile.
Any proposed changes at the societal level, whether local, national or trans-
national, have to be considered in relation to the current advance of global
capitalism as an ideology and a set of practices. It follows that any prescription
for reducing corruption at this level will be contingent upon the political
attitudes and leanings of those in a position to implement them. At the risk of
simplifying political categories, even moderate right versus left leanings4 yield
starkly contrasting prescriptions for reducing corruption. From the far right,
one sees that the best way of eliminating corruption in the public services
4 For current purposes, 'leaning to the right' means giving priority to property-rights, viewing
less regulation as more freedom, emphasising personal responsibility and accountability,
efficiency, choice (at least for the wealthy), corporate financial performance and
shareholder wealth creation, as well as reliance upon incentives and market preferences.
'Leaning to the left', in contrast, implies giving priority to the development of human
potential, viewing poverty-elimination as the most important fonn of 'freedom', an
emphasis upon corporate social responsibility, justice and care, intrinsic values and a
concern for universal well-being.
--------------------
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might be to eliminate the public sector. At the opposite extreme, one observes
brutal state executions for anyone 'found' to be involved in bribery.
A more moderate right-leaning position (Bardhan 1997) sees that facilitating-
payments to government officials can improve economic efficiency and help
growth in cases where regulation is 'excessive' and processes are slow or
costly. However, when viewed from the left, these same 'regulations and
processes' might become legitimate responses to the known limitations of
markets6• Overall, then, prescriptions from the right for reducing corruption
internationally include:
i) Reduce the scope and intrusiveness of the public sector (less
government).
ii) Ensure the public sector is generally supportive of profitable
('worthwhile') private initiatives.
iii) Pay public servants adequately but also ensure they are properly
motivated.
iv) Reduce political patronage and cronyism.
v) Ensure that the reputation of public servants matters long-term, so have
vigilant (right-leaning) press.
vi) Create cultures of business efficiency, competitive wealth-creation.
vii) Increase monitoring, accountability and awareness of legal
consequences.
Whereas a corresponding set ofleft-Ieaning prescriptions are as follows:
i) Increase the scope of the public sector in order to overcome the known
limitations of markets.
ii) Reduce privileges in society that are based on non-earned income.
iii) Create a culture of wealth distribution by merit and need, not cronyism
nepotism and unfair inheritances.
iv) Create a stronger sense of community, with less selfishness.
5 However, this overlooks the growing incidence of private-to-private corruption.
6 From a politically neutral position, it can be seen that bribes are more likely to be paid in
circumstances where regulations are complex and their application is uncertain; but there
is a high level of profitable business opportunity, but that public officials are more likely
to solicit or accept a bribe (a) when there is political instability, (b) when their
remuneration is low, or (c) when they exercise a high level of discretion (Jacoby,
Nehemkis & Eells 1977).
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v) Ensure that the reputation of corporations matters long-term, so have
vigilant (left-leaning) press.
vi) Emphasise intrinsic and care-based motives, with a general awareness of
consequences for self and others.
Taking into account the limited available evidence on attitudes towards
corruption, it now seems that a balance or compromise between left and right
can be struck on this issue, such that the following four prescriptions might
have a reasonable chance of acceptance across a wide central band of the
political spectrum:
i) Public and private sectors should adopt communication/propaganda
strategies that raise general awareness of the various consequences of
corruption (cf. section 5.1).
ii) Business entities should respond to market limitations and regime
weaknesses by lending ongoing support to programs and agencies that
promote human rights, environmental improvement and corruption
reduction (cf. section 5.2).
iii) The private sector should sustain a liberal individualistic culture, but
augment it so that it has dual motives (Molyneaux 2003, p. 141) that
include not only commercial interests but also moral commitments,
protection of human rights, care of stakeholders and the environment;
finally,
iv) The public sector in all states should combine a public-good mission
with locally determined adequate remuneration.
Conclusion
Amartya Sen once wrote that the success of capitalism depends in part on
'business honesty in the face of contrary temptations' (1999, p. 279). It also
depends on similar types of honesty and forthrightness in the public sector, not
to mention at the national and trans-national political levels. Honesty is
particularly needed regarding the known limitations of the current order.
Certainly, the historical quest to link production and distribution more directly
to human rights, social justice and environmental protection is very far from
over.
The currently fashionable right-leaning individual accountability approach to
reducing corruption,.together with the enduring justice and care orientation on
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the left,· ultimately share the same type of mission: both are driven by a
commitment to some form of moral progress. At this point, what seems most
necessary is a concerted attempt on both sides and at all levels to heighten
awareness of the consequences of corruption, to improve understanding of
some of the applicable ethical principles, but also to cultivate a general ethos
involving authentic moral commitments, human rights and environmental
concerns, in business and in politics.
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Appendix-I: Results of the Survey ofMNC Executives (2002,3 & 4)
ountry while dealing with publi
Never 1
Rarely 3
Sometimes 21
Usually 13
Extremely frequently 3
A, Frequency of Active vs. Passive Corruption
Question asked: How often have you been asked for a bribe in the MNC's host
c c officials?
nb, Tabulated data in bold are summarised in the main text
B. Impact of not Bribing
Question asked: How often has your non-payment of a bribe resulted in loss of
business?
Never 3
Rarely 3
Sometimes 9
Usually 26
Extremely frequently NIL
Question asked: Thereafter to what extent has the above experience compelled you to
offer a bribe?
Never 6
Rarely 8
Sometimes 14
Usually 12
Extremely frequently 1
I a Ions 0 corrupllon an n erv,
YES NO
Company policy laid down to deal with situations of corruption and 33 8
bribery
C. Company Policy
Question asked: Does your company policy documents lay down a policy to deal with
s'tu f f f db 'b ?
egatlve Impacts 0 corruptIOn an n ery on socIety',
YES NO No
Comments
Company policy documents explicitly mention the negative 3 37 I
impact on society
Question asked: Does your company policy documents mention explicitly the
n f db 'b ?
--------------------------------
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iscretion e) strategic decision-making model 0 any other, please speci y
Company Previous Feedback Personal Decision- Any other, pI
Policy Exp discretion making model specify
Responses 33 8 I 8 NIL I (verbal
policy)
D. Decision-making Process
Question asked: When faced with a situation of corruption or bribery do you refer to
a) company policy b) previous experience c) Feedback from subordinates d) Personal
d
Cuestion asked: Do YOU belie
Not at all NIL
A rare chance 4
To an extent 25
To a great extent 11
Totally 1
E. Personal Beliefs of MNC Managers being interviewed.
ve that human beings are by and large not corrupt?
Cuestion asked: To what exte
Not at all NIL
A rare chance 11
To an extent 21
To a great extent 8
Totally 1
nt can anti-corruption legislation eliminate corruption?
Questions asked:
a) Do you believe that corruption has a negative impact on society?
b) Do you believe that corruption and bribery can have a negative impact on the
environment?
c) Do you believe that corruption and bribery can result in human rights abuses?
YES NO
Corruption has a negative impact on society 41 NIL
Corruption and Bribery can result in human rights abuses 41 NIL
F. Extortion and Organised Crime
a) How often have you been forced to pay because it was a situation where either
your company property or human life was in danger? (keyword: Extortion-
life/property)
b) How often have you been forced to pay organised crime, extortionist or protection
racketeers?
Never Rarely Sometimes Usually Extremely frequently
Extortion-
Life/property 35 6 NIL NIL NIL
Organised
Crime 34 5 2 NIL NIL
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Appendix 2: Corruption Related Decisions with Generic Consequences
Exchange utilities
~
--------
decline
Psychic: utilities
~U
+ exchange
- $ bribe
- expected penalty
- $ Shadow of future
+ incremental EV
of future corrupt deals
+ expected $ benefits from
shadow of future, strengthening of will,
reputation
- fear & anxiety
- self respect, self-esteem
- weakening of the will
- expectations of future character
+ self respect (reputation)
+ expectations of own future character
+ benefits of resolve
+ preservation of ideals
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Fadlitatmg
payment or similar?
Active
~
......
Appendix 3: Flowchart Linking Forms of Corruption with Prescriptions
~
A~tive or Passive?
Key: CRD = corruption related decision
Type A =where there are expected harms, eg, human rights violations
Type B = no expected harms
